A catechism of business cliché – with apologies to Myles na Gopaleen Thursday, Jun 21 2007 

 

Question

Response

What am I here to do…?

….I am here to tell you that…

What conveniently located fruit will we go after first?

The low-hanging…

In what condition was I born?

…ready

What discovery process will we apply to the onion?

We will peel back its layers

What additional distance will we go?

…the extra mile

Outside what container do we need to think?

…the box

What percentage do we intend to give?

110%

What do we want to obtain the maximum of for our expenditure of a buck?

…bang

On what horizontal surface do we want to avoid leaving money?

The table

What mutually satisfactory situation are we aiming for?

…a win-win situation

What duration of haul are we in for?

…the long haul

To increase sales what do we intend to place more of on the street?

Feet

What example of analog instrumentation do we intend to move?

The needle

What lateral translation do we intend to apply to the paradigm?

We will shift it

What kind of upward pointing job is he doing?

Stand or bang

In order to initiate the process what two forms of lurching locomotion will we employ?

Rocking and rolling

To what major religious figure will we urge the other party to come in our discussion?

Jesus

Is the airline industry an example of excessive competition? Friday, Jun 8 2007 

Economics divide businesses into oligopolies, monopolies or those in perfectly competitive markets.  Theory doesn’t address excessive competition – markets so competitive that nobody makes any money.  For an example consider the US domestic airline industry. It seems impossible for a carrier to make money for a sustained period, but players never go out of business. Economics says that companies exit markets if they lose money.  

To the casual observer airlines rarely seem to go out of business, but go into Chapter 11 bankruptcy regularly as clockwork. Why can nobody make any money and why don’t these apparently unsuccessful operators get forced out of business permanently?

In fact, over the years numerous airlines have gone belly-up, if you include those acquired by other airlines. The few successful airlines, such as Southwest, have carefully avoided acquisitions, but mergers are fashionable among the incautious. Wikipedia lists more than 200 defunct airlines, including such notables as PanAm (1927-1991), Braniff (several existences) and TWA which lasted from 1930 until being acquired by American Airlines in 2001.  

Clearly there is excessive competition in the airline industry. I think there are two reasons for this. One is an abundant supply of people just itching to start an airline, none of whom have any experience or knowledge in the business. Some do manage to beat the odds, Virgin being one, although they do not operate in the cutthroat US domestic market.  Numerous others such as Trump, Hooters, ValuJet (now AirTran) and Song (merged back into Delta), have been willing to jump into the sacrificial fire. A new entrant, Skybus, is launching the ultra-low fare model made popular in Europe by Ryanair.  I will be extremely surprised if they are profitable, but I expect they will survive several injection of financing from their hopeful backers.  This regiment of entrants inevitably pulls down potential returns.

The second reason for the excessive competition is the apparent willingness of large lenders to the industry to lose big sums of money.  When airlines are in bankruptcy there seems to be an endless troop of banks willing to advance more cash in the expectation a recovery in the industry is just around the corner.   Additionally airline costs are still very high, and bankruptcy is seen as a model for getting down to a lower-cost model that is thought to be a requirement for survival.

This is a fairly miserable situation for the customer.  Employees have seen their pensions go west, so are generally demotivated and surly.  The airlines have no money to spend on planes so the conditions range from down-at-heel to alarming. Operators, desperate to fill seats, offer very low prices to the casual traveler, subsidized by us business travelers, who pack in despondently. 

I am waiting to see the emergence of small, business-only flights on domestic routes.  If this happens then the big carriers will melt away like summer mist, taking a fortune in frequent flyer miles, but otherwise unmourned.

Nicholas Kristof’s Factory of the World Thursday, May 24 2007 

See Nicholas Kristof’s video on the New York Times site today for an interesting slant on manufacturing conditions in Guangzhou province.  He makes a point, related to myone below, that we can no longer even view the garment factories in SE China as being sweatshops.   Conditions, pay and the level of opportunity have risen dramatically.  Much of the concern in the US about worker’s conditions in these places does not rest on entirely pure motives…

 

China’s Blackstone Investment Monday, May 21 2007 

See Jonathan Stempel on Blackstone’s IPO. It is hard to say which part of this deal is the most brilliant. Obviously the IPO is very strongly anticipated but selling a $3bn to China’s state investment company helps the process along. The deal also indicates to Blackstone’s rivals that the firm has tapped into a new source of funds to continue the private equity spree. (A condition of the deal is that China is prevented from making a similar investment in Blackstone’s rivals for a year). For China, this gets them into investments in the global stock markets without having to front deals, a process that has been shown to generate significant backlash. It also recognizes that for China the global markets are now the most attractive investment avenue. Currencies are going to offer a lot of risk, and the bond market is looking at interest rate upticks. This message, that the Chinese trade surplus is going into stocks, is good for the market, which is good for IPOs, which is good for Blackstone’s IPO in particular….

The Illusion of Abundance Wednesday, May 16 2007 

Despite what economists will say, there is an iron law about the provision of goods and services that says there is only so much good stuff to go around. Economics predicts that as demand for a good rises, so will price, causing the supply of the good to increase, bringing more to the market at a higher price. This encapsulates the promise that we can always have more of what we enjoy. For anything that truly matters this is not so.

While we can continue to consume more of anything, the problem is that most goods become inferior as their production and supply is scaled up. To produce a lot of anything, the means of production must become industrialized. In many cases the consequence is a fall in the quality of the good being produced. While we usually can buy more, the value of the experience tends to go down. If you don’t believe this, eat at any chain restaurant. These establishments have perfected the mechanized production, preparation and delivery of food. Portions are massive but the experience is mediocre.

Current house construction is another example. The demolition of a modern house is a revealing sight. It requires shockingly little effort to reduce a contemporary building to rubble. Find a place in a new house where there is no brick – usually not too difficult – and you can drive a car through the exterior wall at modest speed. You probably won’t even get hurt. Building techniques that make houses less vulnerable to hurricanes and tornadoes are well-established; the problem is that they cost too much, so are never applied. More accurately, we are told they cost too much.

Visit a Wal-Mart or K-Mart and marvel at the variety of useless junk on display. Here is an apparent wealth of goods, made in the cheapest manner and displaying the smallest possible amount of good design. Further up the economic chain, in stores furnishing apparently higher-quality goods, the situation changes but doesn’t always improve. Often, one sees equally poor-quality goods, packaged more expertly, and advertised more expensively.

There are occasional islands of excellence in this landscape. Automobiles from Europe and Japan truly show higher quality than was historically the case, while being made on an industrial scale. Target is a mid-priced store that is genuinely trying to offer products that are better designed and manufactured. However, more generally, people continue to expect to be supplied the lowest common denominator at the poorest quality they will accept.

As with products, experiences seldom scale up satisfactorily. If you liked visiting a foreign country, you will enjoy doing so far less when the experience becomes mass-marketed and homogenized. Cable television provides an endless list of channels, but there is a limited number of talented programmers, whose work is now more difficult to locate amidst the dross.

From time to time and in certain arenas, people do rebel against this tyranny, although in small numbers. In many localities one can find more good cheese, decent beer and artisan bread, albeit at a steep price, than ten years ago. The existence of these goods supports my argument and also shows that inflation, corrected for reduction in quality, is much higher than we are led to believe. The market for truly scarce goods such as fine art and prized real estate reflects reality, as prices soar in response to limited supply.

Unfortunately we are unwilling to suspend consumption when faced with products on offer that have made the transition from inexpensive to truly cheap.

How should we respond, as producers and as consumers? As producers, we need to realize that when a good becomes commoditized nobody will make any money producing  it or derive much satisfaction from its consumption. We need to invest in solid brands conveying specific attributes that we adhere to and carrying guarantees of performance. We need to embrace the educated consumer and be willing to participate in third party organizations that furnish objective information to the market. We should accept that progress may mean producing less of our product but making it better and longer-lasting. We need to invest in producing superior products that will require less advertising and marketing inducement to attract buyers.

As consumers, we should ideally be prepared to spend our money only when we see something genuinely good on offer. We should be willing to keep goods we buy for longer periods of time and be prepared to buy fewer of them at higher prices. It isn’t easy to do this, but we have to get in the habit of demanding variety and quality and be prepared consume less. This doesn’t mean that we become self-sufficient small farmers; it simply means that we insist on better goods. We should insist on better-constructed, smaller homes, especially where we must cope with the threat of catastrophic weather conditions. We must put more knowledge and time into the process of buying. Above all, if the market doesn’t provide what we seek at the quality we want, we should buy nothing.

US Manufacturing Employment Tuesday, May 15 2007 

I wonder is this typical: at a recent company long-range planning meeting we concluded that our employment in the US will fall by around 6% over the next five years. A lot of this is technology and productivity, with a certain amount of positions going overseas, balanced to some degree by increased technical employment domestically. In practice our domestic employment will probably rise as we do some acquisitions in the US, but if this is typical it suggests that the continuing fall in manufacturing employment has not yet reached its bottom.

Of course, we are a large company, and this trend is not unusual. The question is whether the emergence of small enterprises, either service or manufacturing, can balance this reduction.

I don’t know for sure, but I expect the answer is yes. What is less clear is what will happen to wage rates as a result of this process

Chrysler and Daimler’s divorce Tuesday, May 15 2007 

By any standards the news that Chrysler Group will be bought by Cerberus Capital Management is astonishing. Most commentators seem to emphasize the fact that Daimler is not having to put as much money into the deal as was feared, in order to persuade someone to take Chrysler off their hands. The Daimler share of the tab, according to reports, is around $678M. The larger picture is that Daimler consummated a $36M merger in 1998 that they are now paying to get out of, having destroyed an almost unimaginable amount of value in the intervening period. That Daimler considers this to be a bargain is a testament to how badly things have departed from the script.

An aspect that I don’t hear mentioned much is the impact this disaster appears to have had on Daimler. Many commentators have remarked on how Daimler’s quality and design have deteriorated in recent years. This is hardly a coincidence, since managing a huge integration that went seriously awry must have consumed vast quantities of management attention as well as, recently, lots of cash.

Meanwhile Audi has resurrected itself and BMW has consolidated its already very strong position. The interesting question will be whether Daimler can retake its former position when the albatross is no longer around its neck.

John Browne and homophobia in the corner office Sunday, May 13 2007 

The forced resignation of John Browne over revelations surrounding his homosexuality has resulted in remarkably little discussion. Here is an intelligent and sympathetic posting on HedgeFolios. Anyone who thinks that Browne’s fate is just and appropriate should consider two things: First, how easy would it be to be an openly gay CEO in today’s business climate, particularly in the oil industry. Secondly, given that situation, who would honestly say that, when faced with exposure by the tabloid press, he would be entirely truthful under pressure of cross-examination about every detail of his personal life .

Why Restraining Executive Pay Makes No Sense – III Sunday, May 13 2007 

The third reason why society might want to intervene in CEO compensation is simply to obtain a specific outcome for policy reasons. Governments may prefer that CEOs be paid less if that is what voters seem to want. If my argument in the previous posting is correct, one can move CEOs down the line of intersection of the demand and supply curves with impunity. It is very rare that interference in markets will result in such limited fallout. Intervention will not really distort the market and will not cause CEOs suddenly to quit in protest. What is the problem with doing this? Well, the first point is that the burden of proof is on those supporting interference. Why adjust the compensation of CEOs and not go after golfers, football players or any highly-paid person? There is the perception that CEOs in particular “don’t deserve it”, while a sports celebrity does. This can only be based on the conclusion that the process of choosing CEOs is not based solely on ability and merit, which may well be the case, but this is surely the fault of shareholders and their boards. For reasons of equity it isn’t clear why one can justify meddling in one person’s pay but not another’s. Certainly some of them deserve to be in their current roles. If Tiger Woods’ compensation were to be reduced by fiat to half its current level – a modest $50m or whatever – he would still play golf, presumably equally well, and nobody would live their lives much differently. Nevertheless ,there is no moral justification for doing so, and the attempt would be met with protests from lovers of the game who feel that Mr. Woods deserves whatever he earns. Regulation of pay is something you do to everyone or no-one.

If attempts to protect shareholders are unwarranted and efforts to “correct the market” are counter-productive, and if it is not morally or economically valid to try to direct CEO compensation towards a particular outcome, then the effort should be abandoned entirely.

Why Restraining Executive Pay Makes no Sense – I Friday, May 11 2007 

I have been considering executive pay for a while, and my conclusions run counter to the current orthodoxy. I believe that attempts to limit top executive compensation are ill-considered and ineffective, and it is time we faced up to this. To put my cards on the table, I am in a senior position but I am not in the category that we are speaking of. My compensation package, sadly, is fully deductible under corporate taxation regulations and will remain so for a long time! (i.e. less than $1M). Although I probably am somewhat in sympathy with the people in the corner office, I find many pay packages offered to this privileged class as distasteful as anyone else does. I don’t support effort to rein these in, and I question the thinking and motives of anyone who does.

There are really only three possible reasons for trying to influence executive compensation, and I will address each one in a separate posting. The first justification might be to protect shareholders from profligate insiders effectively stealing assets. A single proprietor will control the compensation policies within an organization, and it is hard to understand why this becomes so difficult when there are multiple shareholders involved. Certainly, as we know, there need to be mechanisms put in place to ensure that the full cost of compensation is made clear, but shareholders should be able to decide whether or not they want to look after their own money. In many cases, of course, shareholders don’t express much interest in managing executive pay, for two reasons. Firstly, the sum of money involved, although often very large in absolute terms, is very small in the context of financing a large corporation. Executive compensation for a $30m company can loom large as a percentage of profits, but for a $30bn corporation with the same profitability the sum is minuscule.

The second reason that shareholders don’t manage compensation closely is because they are very concerned to get the most capable person, correctly realizing that a bad CEO can be a disaster even over a short period of time. They are prepared to risk overpaying, provided they get someone good. Obviously they don’t want to get an expensive idiot, but the error of not attracting the top potential talent is a worrying one, and the sums to be saved by miserliness are very modest.

Shareholders could have additional reasons for avoiding unseemly packages. They might be concerned about the impact on the other employees, or trickle-down increases (which could be very expensive), but they seem oblivious to these. Given that shareholders don’t appear to want to reduce the cost of CEO compensation for a variety of reasons, why does it become the government’s role to intervene to protect their interests?

There may be other motivations for society to get involved and I will discuss these tomorrow.

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